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Environmental Law and the Supreme Court: 
Three Years Later 
RICHARD J. LAZARUS* 
Since my Garrison lecture three years ago, the Court has re-
mained remarkably constant in at least one significant respect: Its 
membership. Justice Breyer remains today, as he was three years 
ago, the most junior Justice. Political scientists dub a court made 
up of the same judges over time as a "natural court." Because Jus-
tice Breyer joined the Court in 1994, that means the Supreme 
Court has been a "natural court" for eight years and counting. 
While that might not seem like along time to some, for the Su-
preme Court that is a very long time. Indeed, it is the second long-
est time in the Court's history. Between 1811 and 1823, when 
there were only seven Justices on the Court, there were no 
changes in membership. Only on two other occasions has the 
Court gone for as long as six years.1 
The significance for environmental law is considerable. This 
is a Court with an affirmative agenda. It is not a passive Court. 
The Justices have discrete areas oflaw that they are interested in 
shaping and, because the Justices know each other so well, they 
are better able to maintain the stable majority necessary for such 
a shaping to be accomplished. They, accordingly, systematically 
grant review and decide cases that present the relevant legal is-
sues in settings favorable to the outcome that the majority seeks 
to promote. When, moreover, the Court is so capable of sending 
out such clear signals, it is far more likely that sympathetic insti-
tutionallitigants and lower court judges can effectively serve up 
to the Court cases that are attractive vehicles for lawmaking. 
The upshot has been a Court able to issue a series of major 
related rulings in relatively short order. The gradual incre-
mentalism that is supposedly structurally built into judicial deci-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks are owed to 
Carrie Jenks, Georgetown University Law Center 2003, who provided outstanding 
research assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1. See Supreme Court Historical Society, Presidential nominees, available at 
http://www.supremecourthistory.orglfp/courtlist.htm; see also THE OXFORD COMPAN· 
ION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Kermit Hall, ed. 1992). 
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sion-making is in short supply these days. The opportunity for 
conflict with the other branches of government is correspondingly 
increased. Deprived of a meaningful opportunity to reshape their 
own lawmaking efforts in response to the Court's rapidly evolving 
jurisprudence, the legislative and executive branches more fre-
quently find themselves out of step with the Court. Once out of 
step, the lawmaking efforts of the other branches are more suscep-
tible to legal challenge. That is also why the current Court, not-
withstanding its "conservative" views, seems especially ready to 
overturn the decisions of other branches within the federal system 
and of state sovereigns.2 In short, the stability within the Court is 
the source of some instability in its dealings with other parts of 
the government. 
The Court's resurgent activism has been and portends to con-
tinue to be highly relevant to environmental law because of the 
way that environmental law interacts with those areas of law on 
the Court's front burner. Environmental law, largely because of 
the nature of the ecological problem that it seeks to address, de-
pends upon certain institutional relationships between competing 
lawmaking authorities both within branches of government and 
between competing sovereigns. Environmental law expresses cer-
tain values and priorities that raise conflicts with other values 
and priorities, including some of a constitutional dimension. Wheth-
er by happenstance or design, much of the Supreme Court's cur-
rent agenda seems disproportionately ready to unsettle those in-
stitutional relationships and the hierarchy of values upon which 
modern environmental law has depended since 1970. 
In my Garrison Lecture three years ago, I surveyed the envi-
ronmental law decisions of the Supreme Court between 1970 and 
1999. I commented on which Justices had been more or less influ-
ential in shaping the Court's decisions and, even more provoca-
tively (if not foolishly), sought to "score" the individual Justices on 
their responsiveness to environmental protection concerns based 
on their votes cast in a subset of those cases.3 The broader thesis 
2. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court 1998 Term Foreword: The New 
Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARv. L. 
REV. 29 (1999); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the 
Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 4 (2001); Linda Greenhouse, The High Court's Target: Con-
gress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001 § 4 at 3. 
3. Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in the Su-
preme Court, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999). The Garrison lecture was my initial 
analysis and publication. I subsequently published a fuller description of the results 
of my survey of the Justices in Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental 
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of the lecture, however, was that there is something distinctively 
"environmental" about environmental law and that the Court's in-
creasing inability to appreciate that dimension was leading to 
more poorly-reasoned decisions and results. 
Pace has now provided me with the luxury to revisit my ear-
lier conclusions with the benefit of three additional years of hind-
sight. To that end, this update addresses three topics. First, it 
considers whether the opinion assignments and votes of individ-
ual Justices during the past three years either reinforce or under-
mine my prior assessment. Second, the update surveys the most 
significant environmental law decisions of the past three years 
and considers their portent for the possible restoration of what is 
"environmental" about environmental law in the Court. Third 
and finally, the update identifies important legal issues now loom-
ing before the Court.4 
I. Reexamining the Environmental Scorecard of the 
Justices 
The only completed Supreme Court Terms since my 1999 Gar-
rison Lecture are the October Terms 1999 and 2000. Although the 
current Term is now more than halfway completed, there are not 
yet any decided environmental law cases. As it happens, there are 
almost no such cases on the docket this Term. The only exception 
is Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Commission,5 the latest in a seemingly never-ending series of 
regulatory takings challenges to environmental land use restric-
tions.6 
During the last two Terms, however, the Court decided twelve 
additional cases arising in an environmental law context, as 
broadly described in my 1999 Lecture. As in the past, these cases 
include classic public land law controversies, pollution control con-
flicts, original actions raising border and interstate water alloca-
About Environmental Law, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 703 (2000). A fuller description of the 
numerical analysis underlying my Garrison lecture is set forth in that separate 
publication. 
4. 528 U.S. 167 (1999). 
5. No. 00-1167 (U.S. argued Jan. 7, 2002). The court has decided this case since 
this article first went to press. See note 77, infra. 
6. E.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.s. 725 (U.S. 1997); 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003 (1991); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 
(1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
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tion disputes. They also include many cases that raise legal issues 
for which the environmental setting would seem wholly incidental 
to the resolution of the precise legal issue before the Court.7 
The leading opinion writer for the Court in the past survey 
was Justice White by a large margin. During the past three years, 
the opinion writing is far more evenly divided. Justices Scalia and 
Ginsburg lead the pack, each writing three out of the twelve cases, 
with Justices Kennedy and Souter responsible for two opinions 
each. The small number of cases plainly limits the significance of 
any of these numbers.8 
Justice Kennedy continued his remarkable feat of almost 
never dissenting in an environmental law case before the Court. 
In my earlier survey, Justice Kennedy was, aside from one inter-
state water allocation dispute and a few qualified concurring opin-
ions, in the majority in virtually all fifty-seven of the 
environmental cases in which he had participated. For the twelve 
new cases, Kennedy kept his record fairly intact. He dissented 
only once, in Idaho v. United States,9 which raised a dispute be-
tween the federal and state governments regarding ownership of 
certain submerged lands. Still, as before, no single Justice dis-
sents from the majority very often in the environmental cases. 
The lowest percentage for a Justice being in the majority was still 
well above seventy percent. 10 
The final category, the "environmental protection" (EP) scores 
of the Justices, is also intriguing. In the last survey, I described 
several prominent examples in which individual Justices voted 
quite differently than one might expect. So-called "liberal" Jus-
tices voted for positions denounced by environmentalists, and Jus-
tices whom environmentalists presume are hostile to their legal 
positions in fact voted in their favor. I also explained some of the 
reasons for that phenomena and why its occurrence is not at all 
paradoxical, but rather to be expected. Indeed, that is why it was 
so striking that Justice Douglas maintained an EP score of 100 in 
favor of environmental protection. No matter what the legal is-
sue, no matter what the context, the Justice always managed to 
cast a vote in favor of the position supported by environmentalists. 
For that same reason, it is interesting that each of the Jus-
tices popularly aligned with the liberal side of the Court consist-
7. A full listing of the cases is included in Appendix A, infra. 
8. See Appendix A, infra. 
9. 533 U.s. 262 (2000). 
10. See Appendix A, infra. 
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ently voted in favor of the position supported by environmentalists 
during the past several years. As in 1999, for the purposes of this 
inquiry, I have identified a subset of cases for which the environ-
mental context was more than wholly incidental to the issue 
before the Court. I have included six cases: Friends of the Earth 
v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., (Clean Water Act envi-
ronmental citizen suit standing),l1 Public Lands Council v. Bab-
bitt (Department of the Interior Taylor Grazing Act regulations),12 
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers (Clean Water Act jurisdiction over "isolated" wa-
ters),13 Whitman v. American Trucking Association (nondelega-
tion doctrine challenge to Clean Air Act),14 American Trucking 
Association v. Whitman (relevance of costs in promulgation of na-
tional ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act),15 
and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (regulatory takings challenge to 
state wetlands protection law).16 Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer cast all of their votes in these six cases in sup-
port of the environmentalist position. 
By contrast, the conservative members of the Court were not 
nearly so one-sided. Justices Thomas and Scalia voted in favor of 
the environmentalist-favored position in three out of the six cases; 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy 
did so in four out of the six cases. The lowest EP score for any 
Justice, accordingly, was a fifty, which was far higher than their 
previous scores, albeit based on an even smaller sample than 
before. 17 
Justice Scalia, moreover, authored the Court's opinion in the 
two cases that handed environmentalists and federal regulators 
their single biggest win in the Supreme Court in decades. The 
Court granted review in the two American Trucking Clean Air Act 
cases separately, had separate briefings in the two cases, and 
scheduled them for back-to-back separate oral arguments. Justice 
Scalia authored the single unanimous opinion for the Court dis-
posing of both cases. As further elaborated in the next part ofthis 
update, there was nothing remotely grudging or limited in the 
Court's opinion. Scalia's opinion for the Court constitutes a 
11. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
12. 529 U.S. 728 (2000). 
13. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
14. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
15. [d. 
16. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
17. See Appendix B, infra. 
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sweeping and categorical rejection of the regulated community's 
position on all the legal issues before the Court, or at least, per-
haps more fairly described, of the D.C. Circuit's strained effort to 
revitalize the nondelegation doctrine. 
II. The Court's Recent Rulings and Their Portent for 
Environmental Law 
What is clear at the outset is that the October 1999 and Octo-
ber 2000 Supreme Court Terms included several exceedingly im-
portant environmental rulings. What is less clear is their portent 
for the future of environmental law. The four cases are Friends of 
the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,IB the compan-
ion cases Whitman v. American Trucking AssociationI9 and Ameri-
can Trucking Association v. Whitman,20 and Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island.21 
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw was a significant victory for 
the environmental community. Immediately prior to that ruling, 
the discernable trajectory of the Court's standing decisions was to 
make it increasingly difficult for environmentalists to maintain 
citizen suit enforcement actions. As described in my 1999 Lec-
ture, the Court's opinions in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federa-
tion22 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife ,23 in particular, promoted 
a view of standing requirements that systematically disadvan-
taged citizen suits. The inherent temporal and spatial uncertain-
ties associated with ecological cause and effect coupled with the 
fragmentation of decision-making authority that exists both 
within government and the regulated community in environmen-
tal law seemed poised to render the Court's heightened standing 
requirements of injury, causation, and redress ability virtually 
insurmountable. 
Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Laidlaw, by 
contrast, responds to those very same concerns and reaffirms the 
ability of environmental plaintiffs to demonstrate standing not-
withstanding the inevitable uncertainties in their allegations of 
fact in support of standing. The Court agreed that the plaintiffs in 
an environmental citizen suit need not allege and prove that the 
18. 528 U.S. 167. 
19. 531 u.s. 457. 
20. [d. 
21. 533 U.S. 606. 
22. 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
23. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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pollution will in fact harm the environment in a particular way. 
The plaintiffs need only show injury to themselves, which can be 
satisfied "when they aver that they use the affected area and are 
persons 'for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the 
area will be lessened."'24 The Court further agreed that standing 
is not defeated by the fact that any civil penalties obtained are 
payable to the United States Treasury and not to the citizen plain-
tiffs themselves. The Court reasoned that civil penalties provide 
"redress to citizen plaintiffs ... [t]o the extent that they encourage 
defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them from 
committing future ones."25 
The two American Trucking Clean Air Act rulings likewise 
constituted major victories for environmentalists and environ-
mental regulators. Together, they rebuffed legal arguments that 
challenged two of modern environmental law's most basic precepts. 
The nondelegation case, brought to the Court by the Solicitor Gen-
eral, questioned the very ability of the national government to 
construct an institutional framework for environmental lawmak-
ing. Here too, as with the law of standing, the nature of the prob-
lem environmental law seeks to address generates certain hurdles 
for the lawmaking process. Of relevance to the nondelegation doc~ 
trine, the development of environmental standards necessarily de-
pends on broad delegations of lawmaking authority to regulatory 
agencies. It also requires the agency to promulgate standards 
that are simultaneously enormously controversial, because of 
their distributional implications, and riddled with scientific uncer-
tainty and technical complexity that undermine their trans-
parency. In short, federal environmental law depends on the very 
kind of lawmaking framework that cannot be squared with the 
strict view of the nondelegation doctrine promoted by the D.C. Cir-
cuit and the regulated community in American Trucking. 26 
For that same reason, the Court's sweeping rejection of the 
D.C. Circuit's effort to resurrect a reinvigorated nondelegation 
doctrine was essential to the maintenance of modern environmen-
tal law . The Court's ruling on the nondelegation issue was, more-
over, unanimous. Even the Chief Justice, whose earlier opinion in 
24. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 
(1972». 
25. Id. at 203. 
26. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. E.P.A., 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) opin· 
ion modified on rehearing by 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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the Benzene case had indicated support for closer nondelegation 
doctrine scrutiny,27 joined the Court's ruling, without elaboration. 
The Court also unanimously maintained the status quo in the 
companion case of American Trucking Association v. Whitman, 
upholding EPA's longstanding position that the Clean Air Act 
does not allow the Agency to consider compliance costs in estab-
lishing national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under 
the Act.28 Here too writing for the Court, Justice Scalia did far 
more than just decline to embrace industry's proffered canon of 
statutory construction under which agencies could presumptively 
consider compliance costs in environmental standard setting un-
less Congress expressly and specifically provided otherwise.29 The 
Court effectively endorsed the converse position at least for the 
purposes of promulgating NAAQS under the Clean Air Act. The 
Court reasoned that the factor of compliance costs "is both so indi-
rectly related to public health and so full of potential for canceling 
the conclusions drawn from direct health effects that it would 
surely have been expressly mentioned in Sections 108 and 109 
had Congress meant it to be considered."30 For that same reason, 
Justice Breyer's strained effort in his separate concurrence to re-
habilitate costs as part of the public health inquiry ultimately 
falls flat. 31 
Notwithstanding the Court's rulings in Laidlaw and the two 
American Trucking cases, the warnings about the Supreme Court 
that Professor Oliver Houck delivered in his own Garrison Lecture 
about environmental law's future remain apt today.32 No doubt 
the Court's most foreboding ruling was its decision in Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers33 (SWANCC) in 2001. By a five to four vote, the Court not 
only struck down the so-called "Migratory Bird Rule,"34 but went 
on to hold that the Clean Water Act's definition of "navigable 
waters"35 does not extend to "nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate 
27. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 448 U.S. 607, 
671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
28. 531 U.S. at 469. 
29. Brief Amicus Curiae of the General Electric Co. in Support of Cross-Peti-
tioner, at 7, American Trucking Ass'n v. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1257). 
30. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 469 (emphasis in original). 
31. [d. at 491 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
32. Oliver Houck, Second Annual Lloyd K Garrison Lecture on Environmental 
Law: Environmental Law and the General Welfare, 16 PACE ENVTL. L REV. 1 (1998). 
33. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
34. [d. at 170. 
35. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2002). 
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waters."36 Because, moreover, "navigable waters" is the jurisdic-
tional touchstone for the entire Act, not just for the Section 404 
program, the Court's ruling is equally applicable to the Section 
402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit 
program.37 
The significance of the Court's ruling is also not confined to 
the meaning of the Clean Water Act. The majority explained that 
it would have declined to defer to the Army Corps' statutory inter-
pretation even in the absence of "plain meaning" because of the 
'serious constitutional problems' that would have been raised by 
the broader construction of the Act's jurisdictional scope.38 Ac-
cording to the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court, there are "sig-
nificant constitutional and federalism issues" concerning whether 
Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause39 to regu-
late dredge and fill activities in such isolated waters.40 "Permit-
ting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and 
mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird Rule'41 would result in 
a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary 
power over land and water use. "42 
What is most striking about the result in SWANCC is that 
until relatively recently, one could have safely assumed that the 
federal government would have easily prevailed on both of the 
questions presented. In United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc. ,43 to be sure, the Court expressly declined to address 
the precise issue of statutory construction before the Court in 
SWANCC.44 The essential rationale of Riverside Bayview, how-
ever, especially as it relates to longstanding administrative con-
struction, legislative ratification, and statutory objectives, is the 
same for both cases. The Court in Riverside Bayview had already 
overcome the most difficult hurdle in construing "navigable wa-
ters," which was to uphold the notion that it extends to waters 
that are themselves not navigable and are instead a seasonally 
varying mixture ofland and water.45 
36. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72. 
37. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2002). 
38. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173. 
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
40. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. 
41. 51 Fed. Reg. 41, 217 (Nov. 13, 1986). 
42. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. 
43. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
44. Id. at 131-32 n.8. 
45. Id. at 138. 
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Even more remarkable, however, was the Court's characteri-
zation of the Commerce Clause issue as problematic. To be sure, 
the "Migratory Bird Rule's" focus on whether certain birds crossed 
interstate borders does not even remotely reflect the relevant fac-
tors for determining Commerce Clause jurisdiction. It certainly 
did not after United States v. Lopez,46 but also likely did not even 
do so before Lopez. The infirmities of the "Migratory Bird Rule," 
however, simply reflect the fact that the Rule asks the wrong 
question. It does not mean that if one asks the right question, 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction does not exist for the very kind of 
federal regulation at issue in SWANCC: Quite the opposite is 
true. Properly framed, federal regulation of either dredge and fill 
activities or discharges of pollutants into waters of the United 
States, no matter how broadly defined, is well within Congres-
sional Commerce Clause authority both before and after Lopez. 
The essentially economic nature of both the regulated activi-
ties themselves as well as their impacts fit well within a classic 
notion of regulation of activities that "substantially affect" inter-
state commerce. The precise environmental media-air, land, 
water-is not determinative of the economic character or substan-
tiality of either the activity or the impact. In SWANCC, for exam-
ple, the activity involved the construction of a large landfill 
facility, which is itself a commercial undertaking as are the nu-
merous waste collection activities intimately associated with the 
landfill.47 In addition, in SWANCC, the proposed landfill, by de-
stroying habitat upon which substantial populations of migratory 
birds depended, would directly affect the multi-million dollar tour-
ism and recreational industry that depends on maintenance and 
protection of such bird populations. 48 
The Court's constitutional problem with the Clean Water Act 
is not, at bottom, based on the notion that Congress could not in 
fact regulate the very activities at issue in SWANCC. It is instead 
based on the very different problem that the "Migratory Bird 
Rule," and perhaps even the Act's current statutory structure and 
jurisdictional touchstone fail to reflect the Court's newly con-
structed framework for Commerce Clause analysis post Lopez,49 
46. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
47. Respondents' Brief at 43-47, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (No. 
99-1178). 
48. Id. at 47-49. 
49. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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and United States v. Morrison. 50 Instead, the Clean Water Act, 
like most of the other comprehensive federal environmental laws 
that Congress first enacted in the 1970s, pays little attention to 
Commerce Clause concerns in the first instance. These laws are, 
as Professor Oliver Houck described in his own Garrison Lecture, 
sub silentio premised on expansive notions of Congressional power 
under the General Welfare Clause.51 
Environmental laws inevitably regulate and affect commerce 
because the nation's natural resources literally supply, after all, 
the basic ingredients of commercial life. But that is not to say that 
the objectives of those laws are commercial or that their commer-
cial character is the reason the laws regulate certain activities. 
What frequently makes environmental laws so historically unique 
and important is that they promote a different vision of the rela-
tionship between humankind and the natural environment, which 
is deliberately not commercial in its emphasis. 
Hence, even assuming that Congress could theoretically re-
write all of the current federal environmental laws in a manner 
wholly compatible with the Court's current Commerce Clause 
analysis, without any jurisdictional loss, the fact remains that 
there is an analytical gap between the Court's precedent and the 
existing statutes. It would, moreover, be no easy task simply to 
reenact existing laws in a manner more harmonious with the new 
judicial precedent. It is far more difficult under our system oflaw-
making to enact statutes than it is to prevent their enactment. 
And, that would be especially so in the environmental arena, now 
that the substantiality of the cost implications of various statutory 
schemes are better understood then they were at the time of their 
original enactment. In the aftermath of SWANCC, for example, 
the legislative hurdles are high and wide to now amend the Clean 
Water Act to recapture the more expansive meaning of "navigable 
waters" and "waters of the United States" rejected by the Court in 
SWANCC. 
Until SWANCC, the threat posed to existing federal environ-
mental laws was only theoretical. The origins of the Court's revi-
siting of its Commerce Clause analysis were primarily derived 
from the Court's understandable concern with Congress's never-
ceasing proclivity to expand the federal criminal jurisdiction of the 
50. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
51. Houck, supra note 32, at 13; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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federal judiciary.52 Neither of the laws struck down in Lopez or 
Morrison involved matters that readily lent themselves to state 
regulation in the absence of an overarching federal framework. 
Environmental protection requirements, by contrast, have been 
highly dependent on the existence of just such a comprehensive 
federal administrative framework even when that framework ulti-
mately seeks state and local implementation efforts. 
Finally, the Court has decided yet another significant regula-
tory takings claim, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,53 since I presented 
my Garrison Lecture. The Palazzolo results were far more mixed 
for both property rights advocates and governmental regulators. 
For each, there were parts of the opinion to be applauded, yet also 
other parts that should raise substantial concerns. 
At issue in Palazzolo were two different kinds of per se tak-
ings tests, one favored by developers and the other by government 
regulators. The first concerns the relevance to the regulatory tak-
ings inquiry when a landowner acquires the property after the re-
striction being challenged is in place. In Palazzolo,54 the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court held that such pre-acquisition notice is an 
absolute defense to a takings claim whether brought under Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council55 or Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York. 56 This so-called "notice rule" amounts 
to a per se "no takings" test. 
The second concerns the degree of deprivation required to 
trigger a finding that a land use restriction is a per se taking 
under Lucas. In Lucas, the U.s. Supreme Court held that a Lucas 
per se taking required a threshold finding that the landowner had 
been deprived of all economic value or use.57 Palazzolo argued 
before the Supreme Court in favor of an expansion of Lucas in 
which a landowner's loss would be measured by the amount of use 
or value allegedly lost by the restriction rather than by the 
amount of use or value remaining. 58 Palazzolo further argued for 
an expansion of Lucas under which a court would consider only 
52. See Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penal· 
ties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 Dmrn 
L.J. 1641 (2002). 
53. 533 U.s. 606 (2001). 
54. 746 A.2d 707 (R.!. 2000). 
55. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
56. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) 
57. 505 U.S. at 1015. 
58. 533 U.S. at 623. 
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the restricted portion of the land in deciding whether a depriva-
tion of all economic value or use had occurred. 
The Court rejected both the per se no takings test at least as 
applied in Palazzolo, and Mr. Palazzolo's request that it expand 
the potential applicability of the Lucas per se takings test. 59 With 
respect to the former, the Court reasoned that "[t]he State may 
not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean Bundle."60 
"It would be illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim 
because of the post-enactment transfer of ownership where the 
steps necessary to make the claim were not taken, or could not 
have been taken, by a previous owner."61 
In likewise rejecting the landowner's competing per se test, 
the Court substantially limited the Lucas per se rule by reaffirm-
ing the extreme nature of the regulatory impact needed for its ap-
plication. The Court held that "permitting a landowner to build a 
substantial residence on an lS-acre parcel does not leave the prop-
erty 'economically idle."'62 The Court rejected Palazzolo's claim 
that a Lucas per se taking may be triggered by a substantial re-
duction in value alone, regardless of the amount of remaining 
value in the property.63 
Palazzolo suggests the demise of per se takings analysis in 
favor of the kind of balancing approached favored by Justice 
O'Connor and seemingly favored by Justice Kennedy. Ever since 
Justice White departed from the Court in 1993, it has been clear 
that Justice Scalia's then-recent opinion for the Court in Lucas 
had lost its majority, meaning that the Court was likely to apply 
Lucas only narrowly in future cases. Justice White supplied the 
fifth vote in Lucas and Justice Kennedy, remarkably, joined only 
the Court's judgment and wrote separately. 
As described in my original Garrison Lecture, Kennedy's con-
curring opinion in Lucas embraced a legal analysis that is very 
different than that advanced by the majority. He made plain his 
view that total economic deprivation is not enough, standing 
alone, to justify a per se approach. It is also relevant "whether the 
deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expecta-
tions."64 Kennedy also rejected suggestions that the kinds of 
59. [d. at 631. 
60. [d. at 627. 
61. [d. at 628 
62. [d. at 631. 
63. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616. 
64. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034. 
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"background" legal principles that could justify a complete eco-
nomic deprivation must reflect some static common law. In Ken-
nedy's ''view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light 
of the whole of our legal tradition. The common law of nuisance is 
too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a com-
plex and interdependent society."65 
In Palazzolo, Justice Kennedy's writing for the Court finally 
realized that expectation by narrowly construing Lucas in several 
significant respects. His opinion for the Court narrowly construed 
the economic deprivation trigger necessary for a Lucas per se tak-
ing. His opinion purported not to reach the content of the "back-
ground principles" that provide an exception to a Lucas per se 
taking, but nonetheless described those principles in terms that 
make clear that they are not strictly confined to centuries-old com-
mon law doctrine. In particular, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the 
Court repeatedly presumes that legislation or regulation may be a 
background principle, suggesting that the only question is not 
whether they may be, but the "precise circumstances" of "when" 
they are.66 Perhaps even more significantly, Justice Kennedy's 
opinion for the Court supports the contention that background 
principles not only can change over time, but can do so retroac-
tively. Once, therefore, a land use regulation is deemed to reflect 
"common, shared understandings of permissible limitations de-
rived from a State's legal tradition," background principles will 
apply to all landowners regardless of when they may have ac-
quired their property: "A regulation or common law rule cannot 
be a background principle for some owners, but not for others."67 
The import of Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court, espe-
cially when combined with the concurring opinion of Justice 
O'Connor and the four dissenting Justices is that the Court is 
likely to fall back more on the kind of multi-factored balancing 
tests of reasonableness in its taking analysis, akin to that Justice 
Brennan set forth in his opinion for the Court in Penn Central, 
and away from the Lucas per se approach. Justice Kennedy's 
opinion for the Palazzolo Court repeatedly emphasizes the essen-
tial touchstone of "reasonableness" just as he did in his separate 
concurring opinion in Lucas. And, Justice O'Connor's concurring 
opinion makes even more explicit her view of the continuing via-
65. Id. at 1035. 
66. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629. 
67. Id. at 630. 
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bility of the Penn Central takings analysis and its balancing 
approach.68 
III. The Court's Future Docket 
There is currently only one significant environmental case 
pending before the Court. The day after the Court decided Palaz-
zolo, the Court showed that its appetite for regulatory takings 
claim remained whetted by granting review in yet another case.69 
There are also several major constitutional controversies that 
seemed destined for the Court's review in the near term. Indeed, 
to a certain extent, that Court has essentially invited the lower 
courts to explore the issues, with the apparent purpose of estab-
lishing a lower court record for the Court's review in a future 
proceeding. 
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, 70 landowners appear to have reached the limits of 
the Court's willingness to protect private property rights. The up-
shot may well be the first unconditional victory for government 
regulators in an environmental takings case since Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis in 1987.71 The landown-
ers argue in Tahoe-Sierra that a temporary moratorium on land 
use development constitutes a per se taking under Lucas because 
the landowner is deprived of all "use" of the property during 
the time in which the moratorium is effective. This per se rule 
applies, they argue, regardless of the moratorium's duration, geo-
graphic scope, economic impact, or its interference with reasona-
ble investment-backed expectations. 72 In the aftermath of 
Palazzolo, however, little doubt remains that a majority of the 
Justices are now ready to reject such an extreme per se approach 
to regulatory takings analysis. 
For that same reason, however, government regulators and 
environmentalists have reason for concern that Justices Kennedy 
and O'Connor may, as part of their shift towards balancing tests 
and less absolutist positions, be ready to revisit the "parcel as a 
whole" touchstone that has proved so important to those defend-
ing government regulations challenged as a regulatory taking. In 
68. Id. at 632. 
69. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 533 
U.S. 948 (2001). 
70. 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000). 
71. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
72. Petitioner's Brief at 45, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council (No. 00-1167). 
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Penn Central, the Court ruled that a takings inquiry considered 
the ''parcel as a whole" and not just that smaller portion of the 
property most restricted in deciding whether a land use regulation 
amounts to a taking requiring the payment of just compensa-
tion.73 Because most land use restrictions do not restrict an entire 
parcel, the practical effect of the ''parcel as a whole" analysis can 
be to make it far more difficult for landowners to prevail. 
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Palazzolo suggests 
that there are several Justices who are interested in revisiting the 
''parcel as a whole" test and who are questioning its propriety. 
The Court's opinion formally declined "to examine the persisting 
question of what is the proper denominator in the takings frac-
tion," but only because Mr. Palazzolo did not properly present the 
issue in the courts below or in his petition for a writ of certiorari. 74 
But the Court expressly noted that "at times" the Court "has ex-
pressed discomfort with the logic of the rule," citing University of 
Chicago law professor Richard Epstein,75 who promotes an ag-
gressive application of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation 
Clause to governmental regulation.76 
The Court's invitation is clear. A majority of the Court may 
be ready to revisit the Penn Central holding and is inviting liti-
gants to raise and brief the issue in future cases. It seems likely, 
moreover, that at least the two "swing" Justices, Kennedy and 
O'Connor, will ultimately favor a more nuanced, contextual ap-
proach to defining the property that rejects automatically defining 
the relevant property either in its broadest or narrowest possible 
terms.77 
Another major constitutional issue likely to be on the Court's 
docket in the near future is whether the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) Section 9's application to habitat modification falls within 
Congress's Commerce Clause authority.78 In SWANCC, the Court 
could avoid the constitutional issue by interpreting the "plain 
73. 438 U.S. at 130-31. 
74. 533 U.S. at 631 (emphasis added). 
75. [d. (emphasis added). 
76. RICHARD ALLEN EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN (1985). 
77. The Court decided the Tahoe-Sierra case since this essay went to press in 
March. See 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). By a six to three vote, Justice Stevens' opinion for 
the Court did, as predicted, narrow the applicability of Lucas and expand the applica-
bility of Penn Central. The Court's reasoning, however, also reaffirmed the "parcel as 
a whole" approach. The result was a major win for environmental regulators. 
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2002). 
HeinOnline -- 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 669 2001-2002
2002] THE SUPREME COURT: THREE YEARS LATER 669 
meaning" of "navigable waters." In an ESA Section 9 case, how-
ever, the Court will not be able to similarly avoid the constitu-
tional issue because the Court has already upheld the Department 
of the Interior's regulatory construction of the statutory term 
"take" to extend to modification of habitat that actually harms the 
species.79 To date, two courts of appeals (the D.C. Circuit and the 
Fourth Circuit) have upheld the constitutionality of the statute, 
but both times over loud dissents.8o In the absence of a circuit 
conflict, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on each of those 
prior occasions. 
Although it seems, therefore, unlikely that the Court would 
agree to hear the issue in the absence of a circuit conflict, there is 
reason to believe that such a conflict may soon be presented by one 
of a host of cases pending in the lower courts. The case with the 
most immediate potential to provide a candidate for Court review, 
Shields v. Norton, is now pending before a reportedly skeptical 
Fifth Circuit. If that appellate court rules against the federal gov-
ernment on Commerce Clause grounds, the Supreme Court will 
have little choice but to grant a Solicitor General's request for fur-
ther review. 81 
Whenever it is finally presented to the Court, the question 
whether ESA Section 9 passes constitutional muster will chal-
lenge the Court's commitment to the analytical framework that it 
has adopted and pursued in its recent precedent. The ESA's 
structure and jurisdictional touchstones do not neatly fit that new 
framework, which focuses in the first instance on whether the ac-
tivities being regulated are sufficiently "economic" in character.82 
The dilemma for the Court is that, notwithstanding the awkward-
ness of that misfit, the ESA is the very kind of legislation that is 
necessarily national in its purpose and reach.83 
79. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 
687 (1995). 
80. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,506 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); National Ass'n of 
Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1060 (1997) (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
81. This case was on appeal at the time this essay went to press, but has since 
been decided. See Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2002). The Court did not 
reach the merits because it dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
82. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. 
83. The same could not be readily said of the federal laws at issue in either Lopez 
or Morrison. And, although many believe that it was true of the federal dredge and 
fill permitting program contested in SWANCC, the procedural posture of that case 
masked the federal character of the program before the Justices. Because the State of 
Illinois, unlike most states, has a comprehensive permitting program that applied to 
the proposed dredging and filling activity at issue in SWANCC, the Court may well 
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Whether the Court is willing to recognize the constitutional 
propriety of allowing Congress to address these kinds of environ-
mental and natural resource issues may well turn on its apprecia-
tion of what is "environmental" about environmental law. It 
should be sufficient to sustain national legislation that protection 
and maintenance of the nation's natural resource base is funda-
mental to any viable economy. No greater commercial motive or 
nexus should be necessary. As explained by another Garrison 
Lecturer, Professor Joseph Sax, albeit in another context, it will 
require the Justices to appreciate the "economy of nature" as well 
as respond to the current "market economy."84 
There is reason for defenders of the ESA to be hopeful in this 
regard. Justice O'Connor joined Justice Blackmun's dissent in 
Lujan u. Defenders of Wildlife, which faulted Justice Scalia's opin-
ion for the Court for engaging in a "slash and burn expedition" 
through the environmental law of standing.85 And, Justice Ken-
nedy declined to join part of the majority rationale and wrote sep-
arately about the need for broader Congressional authority than 
contemplated by the majority opinion.86 Even more importantly, 
perhaps, was the Fourth Circuit opinion upholding the ESA's con-
stitutionality in Gibbs u. Babbitt,87 which was authored by Chief 
Judge Wilkinson. Chief Judge Wilkinson is a highly-regarded 
moderate conservative jurist and is more likely to foreshadow the 
views of O'Connor and Kennedy than Judge Luttig who dissented 
in that case.88 
Finally, Justice Kennedy'S overlooked concurring opinion in 
Laidlaw strongly suggests a potential third round of constitu-
tional litigation on the Court's docket in the near future. While 
joining Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Laidlaw, Ken-
nedy separately wrote that '[d]ifficult and fundamental questions 
are raised when we ask whether exactions of public fines by pri-
vate litigants, and the delegation of Executive power which might 
be inferable from the authorization, are permissible in view of the 
responsibilities committed to the Executive by Article II of the 
have been left with the impression that the federal Section 404 permit requirements 
were merely duplicative of the state program. 
84. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993). 
85. 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J. dissenting with O'Connor, J., joining). 
86. [d. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
87. 214 F.3d 483. 
88. [d. at 506 (dissenting opinion). 
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Constitution of the United States."89 Justice Kennedy, in short, 
questioned the constitutionality of environmental citizen suit en-
forcement under Article II as currently provided for in most every 
federal environmental law. 
There are three potentially pertinent clauses in Article II. 
These include the Appointments Clause (§ 2, cl. 2), Vesting Clause 
(§ 1, cl. 1), and the Take Care Clause (§ 3, cl. 4). The Appoint-
ments Clause provides exclusive authority in the President to ap-
point officers of the United States, subject to Senate confirma-
tion.90 The Vesting Clause provides that "the Executive Power 
shall be vested in the President;"91 and the Take Care Clause pro-
vides simply that the President shall "take care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed."92 
The gist of Kennedy's suggestion is that allowing environmen-
tal suits for civil penalties payable to the federal Treasury 
amounts to an impermissible Congressional delegation of Execu-
tive branch authority to private citizens in violation of Article II. 
Kennedy's statement has breathed life into the issue in the lower 
courts because the regulated community is well aware of the piv-
otal role the Justice plays in the Court's decision-making in envi-
ronmental cases. The issue is currently pending in two federal 
courts of appeals and one federal district court in North Carolina. 
The Fifth Circuit case is Shields v. Norton,93 the same case previ-
ously described as raising the question of whether Congress has 
exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in section 9 of the En-
dangered Species Act. In the cases pending before the Eighth Cir-
cuit and in North Carolina, Mississippi River Revival v. City of St. 
Paul94 and North Carolina Shellfish Growers Association v. North 
Carolina Coastal Federation,95 defendants have each raised the 
constitutional defense in resisting a Clean Water Act citizen suit. 
Here too it is no coincidence that this latest constitutional is-
sue arises in an environmental case. The nature of the ecological 
problem to be addressed is what prompted Congress to include cit-
izen suit provisions. The vast number of activities subject to envi-
89. 528 U.S. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
90. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. 
93. No. 00-50839, on appeal, (5th Cir. 2002). As described in note 81, supra, the 
Fifth Circuit has since dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction without reaching 
this issue. See 289 F.3d 832. 
94. No. 01-2511, on appeal, (8th Cir.). 
95. No. 7:01-CV-36-BO(1) (E.n.N.C.) 
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ronmental protection requirements makes it impossible for the 
government to rely solely on its own limited enforcement re-
sources. In addition, the schizophrenic nature of government's 
role in environmental protection-as both regulator and the regu-
lated-renders it all the more important to have a citizen over-
seer. Having the penalties payable to the Treasury is a sensible 
safeguard to ensure against the unjust enrichment of private citi-
zens to the detriment of the public fisc. Ironically, however, it 
may well be that same safeguard that is the nub of Justice Ken-
nedy's suggestion of a possible constitutional infirmity. 
Conclusion 
Environmental law will continue, as it has in the past, to 
raise difficult questions of federal constitutional law. Some of 
these will be rooted in the peculiar way in which the concerns ad-
dressed by environmental law challenge our nation's lawmaking 
institutions and processes. Others are even more fundamental in 
nature because they relate to possible differences in priorities and 
substantive values between environmental law and those re-
flected in certain constitutional guarantees. The Court's ability to 
address both kinds of issues will ultimately turn on the extent to 
which the Justices appreciate the "environmental" dimension to 
the legal issue they face. 
H
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Cite Name* Decided Author** Majority Dissent EP Desig*** C/) 
528 U.S. 167 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 2000 G G, By, OC, R, So, Sc, T Maj ~ 
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. SV,K ~ 
529 U.S. 89 U.S. v. Locke 2000 K K, By, G, OC, R, ~ 
Sc, So, Sv, T ~ 529 U.S. 728 Public Lands Council v. Babbitt 2000 By K, By, G, OC, R, Maj 
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529 U.S. 765 Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. 2000 Sc Sc, K, By, G, OC, Sv, So 0 
U.S. ex reI. Stevens R,T ~ 530 U.S. 392 Arizona v. California 2000 G Sc, R, So OC, K, G, ~ T,Sv,By 
531 U.S. 159 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 2001 R R, OC, Sc, K, T Sv, So, G, By Dis ~ County v. U.S. ::ti 531 U.S. 457 American Trucking Associations v. 2001 Sc Sc, So, K, G, Sv, By R,T,OC Maj ~ Whitman 
531 U.S. 457 Whitman v. American Trucking 2001 Sc Sc, R, So OC, K, G, Maj ~ Associations T,Sv,By 
532 U.S. 1 Department ofInterior v. Klamath Water 2001 So Sc, R, So OC, K, G, ~ Users Protective Ass'n T, Sv, By 
532 U.S. 742 New Hampshire v. Maine 2001 G Sc, R, OC, K, G, T, C/) 
SV,By ~ 533 U.S. 262 Idaho v. United States 2001 So Sv, OC, So, G, By R, Sc, K, T ~ 533 U.S. 606 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island 2001 K K, R, T, OC, Sc Sv, G, So, By Dis 
*Italicized case names are those used in the "EP" scoring. ~ 
**Key to Abbreviation of Names of Justices: By (Breyer); G (Ginsburg); K (Kennedy); OC (O'Connor); R (Rehnquist); Sc (Scalia); So (Souter); Sv 
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APPENDIX B 
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